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Abstract
What does the persistent construction of ‘the homeless’ and the revitalised term ‘our homeless’ include, imply, and ex-
clude in Swedish political debate? And how is it politically and morally related to other houseless groups in the country?
These questions are approached through an analysis of minutes from the Swedish Parliament 2015–2019. Inspired by
Simmel’s (1908/1965) definition of ‘the poor’ as those who get (or would get) public assistance as poor, I claim that in
Swedish political discourse, ‘(our) homeless’ comprise only those to whom the society acknowledges a responsibility to
give shelter, thereby excluding the tens of thousands of people without homes that are temporarily accommodated by
other authorities, private providers or individuals—or not at all. Although official definitions are housing-related, migrants
without homes tend to be defined outside the ‘homeless’ concept, as well as from themunicipalities’ responsibilities. I will
argue that the reasons for this are institutional: regulations and their interpretation, coupled with traditions to care for
only ‘our’ people which, in turn, are fortified by current nationalist sentiments.
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1. Introduction
Many years ago, when I went through old records of poor
relief in the 19th century in a little Swedish town I was
surprised to see the consistency of the list of recipients.
The same widows, disabled men and orphans received
alms by the church by Midsummer and Christmas every
year. These people were called ‘our poor.’ When poor
relief in 1848 was regulated as an obligation of the sec-
ular Poor Board, there was initially some discussion on
whether the ‘regular poor’ would continue to get poor
relief, even though they sometimes did not qualify ac-
cording to the new legislation. Simmel (1908/1965) re-
ferred to this kind of obligation as ‘moral induction,’ i.e.,
the duty to continue to give alms to someone one has
habitually given to previously.
Another common distinction in the 19th century con-
cerned local connectedness. At that time, the Poor Board
was obliged to provide for the local poor, but not for the
‘non-residential’ ones, who could be expelled or trans-
ferred to their hometowns. This practice was common
in all European cities as a means to delimit the municipal
costs for the poor and the number of beggars, aswell as a
measure to keep contagious diseases out, ever since the
16th century (Geremek, 1994). It is today reflected in the
European refugee policies, where a residence permit is a
minimum requirement for access to housing and shelter.
These considerations tell us something about the
weight of institutionalised conceptions of poverty, poor
people and obligations to assist them, and I will argue
that similar tendencies prevail regarding homelessness
today: institutions, comprising both traditions and legal-
rational definitions, determine homeless people’s rights
and entitlements and, by extension, who will be seen
as homeless.
While the balance and dominance of individual ver-
sus structural causes of homelessness have been de-
bated continuously in political fora, in planning for inter-
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ventions and prevention, as well as in research (see, e.g.,
Bullen, 2015; Fitzpatrick, 2005; Neale, 1997; Somerville,
2013), the institutional causes and perspectives are less
highlighted. These include what kind of housing situa-
tions, citizenship, national and local belonging, etc., that
qualify a person for being counted, regarded and treated
as ‘homeless’ in a specific local and historical context.
This article aims to investigate the meanings and po-
litical use of the term ‘homeless,’ and in particular ‘our
homeless.’ I will argue that even though official defini-
tions of ‘homeless’ are rational and based on objective
housing situations, the selection of people who are ac-
tually counted, assisted and included as homeless in the
political debate is related to the traditional view of the
poor, as well as to current nationalist sentiments.
In his classic essay “The Poor,” Georg Simmel
(1908/1965) reflects on the definition and position of the
poor and concludes that “whatmakes one poor is not the
lack of means. The poor person, sociologically speaking,
is the individual who receives assistance because of this
lack of means” (p. 140). As such, the poor are related to
society in away similar to the stranger: he is both outside
(confronting it), and inside it (amember of the collective).
Being confronted and an object of actions by a commu-
nity, however, is also a kind of relationship, and hence
“a particular kind of being inside” (Simmel, 1908/1965,
p. 135). Simmel further highlights that the obligation to
provide for the poor does not imply a corresponding right
to poor relief. Instead, the Poor Board is accountable to
the tax-payers; regulation and rule-bound services are
developed to satisfy this constituency, rather than the
wanting poor. Accordingly, public assistance is aimed at
preventing trouble and unrest, rather than at the poor
as individuals. He asks: “Where do the poor belong?”
Of course, they may be members of a family, an occu-
pation or a church. “But if they are no more than poor,
where do they belong?” (p. 127).
The problem of different definitions of homeless-
ness has attracted substantial research interest over the
years (Benjaminsen, Busch-Geertsema, Filipovic Hrast, &
Pleace, 2014; Busch-Geertsema, Culhane, & Fitzpatrick,
2016; Jacobs, Kemeny, & Manzi, 2004; Sahlin, 1992) but
here, I will primarily focus on their political functions
and implications. Here, I will take Simmel’s definition
and delimitation of the poor as a point of departure
when discussing the definition of ‘homeless,’ as well as
the expression ‘our homeless’ in political debates. What
does it mean, when and why is it used, and who is in-
cluded in or excluded from this term?While this wording
might be specific for Sweden, the practical distinctions
betweenhomeless groups are probably not (see Baptista,
Benjaminsen, & Pleace, 2015).
My empirical data are primarily excerpts from the
Swedish Parliament (Sveriges Riksdag, n.d.-a, n.d.-b,
n.d.-c) September 2015–December 2019. Parliament de-
bates and committee reports are important data in po-
litical and social science research and frequently sub-
jected to discourse analysis (Davidsson, 2010; Kronick &
Rousseau, 2015; Verkuyten & Nooitgedagt, 2019). Right-
wing and racist discourses, in particular, have been stud-
ied in several countries since the 1980s (Fairclough, 2001,
2003; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; van Dijk, 1998). In this
study, I make use of a mixture of discourse analytical
tools and pay special attention to implicit moral accounts
and judgements.
Data and methods used in this article will be further
presented in the following section. Who is regarded or
referred to as homeless by concerned public authorities
in Sweden will be presented next, in Section 3, “Who’s
Homeless,” which includes brief information on other
houseless groups of people, who are named and counted
differently and targeted by other policies and authori-
ties. The section “Whose homeless?” is about belong-
ing: who—if any one—is ascribed responsibility for ac-
commodating people without homes. The fifth section,
“If not Homeless—What?” deals with how houseless
groups that are not called homeless are characterised
and positioned in the political debate. Apart from the
summary, the concluding discussion returns to Simmel’s
claim that definitions are institutionally determined by
obligations, while at the same time reflecting and affect-
ing our thinking and feeling about vulnerable groups and
their entitlements.
2. Data and Method
The Swedish Parliament has 349 members, distributed
across eight political parties in proportion to the re-
sults of the election that takes place in September ev-
ery fourth year; the latest were in 2014 and 2018. The
Social-Democrats (S) and the Green Party (MP) have
formed a minority government since 2014. However, af-
ter the 2018 election, another S-MP Government was ac-
cepted by the Parliament only after an agreement with
the Liberals (L) and the Center Party (C) in January 2019.
The new government promised then, inter alia, to ab-
stain from any cooperation with the Left Party (V) or the
Sweden Democrats (SD).
In the 2018 election, the extreme-right party SD grew
substantially (from 49 to 62 mandates) and has a piv-
otal role in the assembly. After the last election, it has
occasionally scored as the most popular party in opin-
ion polls. However, because of its aggressive xenophobic
or ‘migration-critical’ policy, this party has—as yet—no
close allies in the Parliament, although it has approached
the two conservative parties: theModerates (M) and the
Christian-Democrats (KD).
The parliament year runs from September to
June. For this research, I have studied various kinds
of Parliament documents from September 2015 to
December 2019, covering 4.5 parliament years and parts
of two mandate periods. Most materials for this study
were gathered from the website www.riksdagen.se,
which contains verbatim transcriptions of all debates,
discussions and decisions in the Parliament, as well as
motions (i.e., written suggestions to the Parliament by
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its members), written questions and interpellations to
ministers in the Government (and their replies), and re-
ports and opinions from the parliament committees. It is
possible to search for specific words in certain kinds of
documents for a specific period.
The word ‘homeless*’ (in Swedish: hemlös*) was
found in 324 documents during this time, whereof 70
were chapters in committee reports and 22 propositions
from the Government. Of the rest, 80 were minutes
from the Parliament, 112 motions and about 30 inter-
pellations and questions to ministers and their replies.
I opened all of them and excluded a few as irrelevant, for
instance, if ‘homeless/ness’ referred to consequences of
war or natural catastrophes in other countries, runaway
cats or notes on postponed debates. I copied the rest,
saved them in word files and read through them several
times before subjecting them to amore systematic, qual-
itative analyse. Since I was especially interested in how
‘(our) homeless’ was applied, defined and delimited im-
plicitly or explicitly, I singled out several posts for closer
analysis. The aim of qualitative analysis, especially in an
explorative study like this one, is not to determine the
frequency of a phenomenon or the validity of a claim,
but rather to explore varieties and nuances of its mean-
ing. To get an impression of the contexts in which the
expression ‘our homeless’ was used elsewhere, I also
searched for the term on Google and in news media
archives online.
On riksdagen.se, minutes from Parliament debates
are identifiedwith date and number and divided into sec-
tions reflecting the topics of the discussion. Each speech,
in turn, has a heading with the number of the post, or
entry, and the speaker’s name and party belonging. The
first post of the day gets number 1, and the following
ones are numbered continuously, regardless of the topic.
References to the quotes presented in this article com-
prise the number of the post, name and party of the
speaker, and the date of the discussion.
As recommended by, for instance, Jørgensen and
Phillips (2000), I have formed my package of discourse
analytical tools, adjusted to this kind of material and
research questions. As I am interested in political dis-
tinctions and categorisations of homeless people, I have
looked for contrast structures, a concept coined by
Dorothy Smith (1978) in a famous article where she
showed how the deviant or strangemight be constructed
through contrasting them to the ‘normal’ ones in a nar-
rative. In political debates, speakers tend to start by pre-
senting ‘facts’ to motivate the urge, plea or call for ac-
tion that ends their posts. Modality—that is, to what
extent the speaker/writer seems to agree with and be
certain of the factuality of a statement, or presents it
as a possibility or an opinion, respectively—is an an-
alytical instrument elaborated by critical discourse an-
alyst Norman Fairclough (1992, 2001, 2003). Agency—
who is made accountable or credited for a situation, and
if any agent at all is implied—is another tool gathered
from the same method school (Fairclough, 1992, 2001).
Accounts (Scott & Lyman, 1968) refers to how speak-
ers excuse or justify something they have been (or fear
that they will be) accused for. Just like blaming, this
is a common device in political debates. Subject posi-
tions, i.e., how individuals position themselves and oth-
ers in relation to each other, to a problem, or to so-
ciety, is another useful analytical tool (Davies & Harré,
1990; Fairclough, 2001; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). It is em-
ployed by a wide range of discourse analysts, regardless
of their main affiliation. For instance, homeless people
can be positioned as ‘one of us,’ as victims of the market,
as ‘deserving poor,’ miserable losers—or as a burden or
even a threat to society. Chains of equivalence (Laclau &
Mouffe, 1985) or lists (Fairclough, 2001) refer to the re-
peated enumeration of attributes or phenomena, which
shapes the reader’s/listener’s associations. Since politi-
cians participate in debates to argue for an opinion or
an action, these tools can also be used deliberately as
rhetorical means.
3. Who’s Homeless?
Municipalities in Sweden are obliged to plan for housing
provision for their inhabitants and to see to it that no one
within their borders suffers. The individual is entitled to
assistance to be assured of a reasonable standard of liv-
ing. However, there is no social housing in Sweden, no
enforceable right to housing, and homelessness is not de-
fined in any legislation.
3.1. Official Definitions
Since 1993, the National Board of Health and Welfare
(NBHW) counts homeless persons, 18 years or older, a
week in April every sixth year. Its current definition of
homelessness is partly influenced by the ETHOS defini-
tion (see FEANTSA, 2006), which departs from the ac-
tual housing situation. Four such situations are defined
as ‘homeless’: “roofless/emergency shelter”; “staying in
institutions with no home by discharge”; sublease con-
tract with social services; and private, short-term lodg-
ing (NBHW, 2017, p. 7). The mapping comprises persons
with citizenship or a residence permit in Sweden who
are open cases with the local social services, care institu-
tions or NGOs. By this definition and its explicit elabora-
tion, asylum-seekers, undocumented migrants and “per-
sons from the rest of Europewho reside in themunicipal-
ity but lack anchorage/rootedness there (EU/ESS-third
country citizens)” (NBHW, 2017, p. 13) are excluded.
Comparisons between countries, municipalities, or
over time are complicated by the fact that the recorded
number of people with a certain problem is related to
the number of services offered, resulting in a higher num-
ber of homeless people being counted in cities and coun-
tries with a great number of shelter places than in places
where no or few homeless services are provided—the so-
called service statistics paradox (Busch-Geertsema et al.,
2016; Habitat, 2000; Tipple & Speak, 2005).
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More importantly, the results ofmappings and count-
ing are affected by the choice of survey respondents and
thewaysmunicipalities are organised. Local and national
counts both primarily target persons who are viewed as
entitled to assistance to accommodation through social
services, andwhen guidelines for such assistance change,
so do the statistics. Today, a common interpretation of
the Social Services Act is that the social authorities have
no obligation to provide accommodation for adults who
are ‘only’ homeless, or for whom other agencies are re-
sponsible. As a result of this institutional delimitation,
homeless people counted through the local authorities
or NGOs often have additional problems (e.g., with sub-
stance abuse or mental health).
3.2. Other Houseless Categories
Four large groups of people born abroad are excluded
from regular local and national homelessness mappings
even if their housing situations would be defined as
homelessness according to the NBHW.
The Migration Agency is responsible for asylum-
seekers’ accommodation and subsistence. In January
2020, 40,312 persons were registered in the reception
system. Of these 42% were staying in reception cen-
tres (‘ABO’) and 55% in private accommodation (‘EBO’;
Migration Agency statistics, 2020). The latter group is
usually lodging with relatives and acquaintances, often
in overcrowded conditions. They get no accommodation
allowance and in certain residential areas, they may also
be deprived of their allowance for daily subsistence.
Refugees who have been granted residence permits
and are registered in a municipality are called ‘newly ar-
rived’ for the first couple of years (the establishment pe-
riod). Previous EBO households often remain under sim-
ilar conditions as when waiting for asylum, while former
ABO-residents since 2016 are assigned to municipalities
that are expected to settle them permanently and are
obliged by law to accommodate them for at least two
years. Even if their housing conditions are deficient and
insecure, they are not regarded or counted as ‘homeless.’
Citizens of other EU/EES-countries without work in
Sweden are allowed to stay in the country for three
months, but no central or local authority is obliged to
see to it that ‘vulnerable EU-citizens’ have accommoda-
tion. Since Romania and Bulgaria became members of
the EU in 2007, several people from these countries have
come to Sweden to beg. Surveys estimate their number
to be 4,500–5,000 (“Antalet utsatta EU-migranter,” 2019).
Although a few charities andNGOs in the big cities, some-
times with limited municipal subsidies, have arranged
night shelters and provisional facilities for hygiene, rest,
and food for these migrants, they are generally left to
themselves, staying in tents, caravans, cars or sheds in cir-
cumstances that could be categorised as sleeping rough.
They are not entitled to regular social services or shelter.
EU-citizens can be rejected before three months
have passed if they have “shown to be an unreasonable
burden to the welfare system according to the Social
Services Act” (SALAR, 2014, p. 2). Since this group is part
of the same European Community but not registered as
Swedish inhabitants, its situation is similar to ‘the alien
or non-residential poor’ and the vagrants in themedieval
European city-states (Geremek, 1994),whowere the first
ones to be excluded, punished and sometimes physically
expelled when towns and cities regulated begging.
Because of the high number of rejected asylum-
applications in recent years, the number of undocu-
mented migrants is assumed to be several tens of thou-
sands. Many are quite well-anchored in municipalities
where they may have lived and worked for many years
(see, e.g., Holgersson, 2011). Nevertheless, the police are
expected to expel people whose asylum applications are
rejected or who enter Sweden without the right docu-
ments or without applying for asylum.
‘Structurally homeless’ people, whose lack of homes
is appreciated to be caused only by poverty or shortage
of affordable housing, are in some cities not eligible for
homeless accommodation but may get temporary shel-
ter in emergency cases. The fact that the vast majority
of structurally homeless families come from abroad con-
firms the tendency to exclude non-Swedish people with-
out homes from the ‘homeless,’ as Simmel would define
this word, i.e., from those who (should) get assistance
as homeless.
4. Whose Homeless?
When Simmel asked where the poor belonged, he re-
ferred to who was responsible for providing them with
support and relief. The formal definitions and categori-
sations of people without homes are in part related to
authorities’ official obligations, but in the public debate,
boundaries are also drawn between ‘ours’ and other
homeless. The latter may be declared to be somebody
else’s homeless, but sometimes it is left open if anybody
at all is responsible for them.
4.1. ‘Our Homeless’
‘Our,’ like ‘belonging,’ has a dual connotation of property
and community. It is sometimes aimed at underlining
ownership and implies exclusion, as in the following post:
People exploit the free movement in the EU to come
here and support themselves through begging….It
is a very bad solution for all parties involved that
poor people from other countries are begging on
our streets and outside our shops. (Post 4, Mikael
Eskilandersson, SD, 2017, May 17)
By emphasising that streets and shops are ours, this
speaker indicates that the poor foreigners are transgress-
ing, illegally staying in places that are not theirs.
Being someone’s property is associated to protection
and care butmay also entail subordination, while belong-
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ing to a group, a ‘we,’ connotes to inclusion and solidar-
ity. These meanings of ‘our homeless’ will be highlighted
first. Next, I will explore how homelessness in the pub-
lic debate is being associated with other individual prob-
lems and, finally, what functions this expression may ful-
fil for the political opposition.
4.1.1. Our Protégés and Friends
The expression ‘our homeless’ is sometimes used by
NGOs, especially by charity organisations. In such a con-
text, ‘our’ has a somewhat paternalistic flavour and con-
notes to protection, but at times also to nationalism.
When blamed for only providing soup and Christmas
presents to “Swedish citizens” and for being connected
to the extreme right party (SD), the leader and founder
of the organisation Vid din sida (By your side), declared
that her only focus was to “help our homeless pension-
ers” (Skoglund, 2019). In recent years, SD, in particular,
has used this expression in Parliament debates and state-
ments, as well as in motions. In a debate article, journal-
ist Carl Öström (2016) warns against this party’s possible
plan to put refugees’ and asylum-seekers’ needs against
the ones of Swedish homeless:
Hasse is a homeless Swede and has spent the last
night on commuter trains….Naturally, people’s indig-
nation about newly arrived refugees’ temporary sleep-
ing places upsets Hasse and other homeless people. It
is about standard—what is regarded as unacceptable
for refugees, is commonplace for the homeless. (p. 6)
Note that the author himself distinguishes between
‘refugees’ and ‘homeless.’ Later, he argues that it is
“about time for other political parties to revise their treat-
ment of our homeless” (Öström, 2016, p. 6).
‘Our homeless’ often translates into ‘homeless
Swedes.’ A debate article with the heading “Who
Engages in Homeless Swedes?” had a similar argument:
A generous Swedish refugee policy provides many ad-
vantages. We show solidarity and compassion, enrich
and internationalise our society, make our population
younger and improve our demographics. But if we do
not take concrete, effective measures for our own, al-
ready vulnerable groups we will add fuel to xenopho-
bia and antagonism grows. (Swärd & Eriksson, 2015)
None of these texts argues against better provisions for
non-Swedish people without homes, and ‘refugees’ con-
stitutes one of the ‘groups of homeless people’ in the last
quote, but they are nevertheless discursively excluded
from ‘our’ homeless or groups.
4.1.2. Substance Abuse, Misery—But not Crime
Combinations of attributes that appear so often that one
of them gives immediate associations to the others con-
stitute ‘chains of equivalence’ (Laclau &Mouffe, 1985) or
‘lists’ (Fairclough, 2001). Although the context and syn-
tax may help to define the relations between the words,
such as if one property causes, includes or is caused by
the other, the nature of this relationship remains ob-
scure while the association is consolidated. Not least
in the Parliament debates, ‘homelessness’ is combined
with several other problem terms and qualities repre-
senting misery:
Because of substance abuse, mental illness, debts, in-
sufficient economy, relational problems etc., about
35,000people in Sweden are homeless. (Post 32, Sofia
Modigh, KD, 2017, March 16)
An NGO…working with people who have ended up
in homelessness, substance abuse, psychiatric prob-
lems or several parts of this simultaneously. (Post 55,
Roland Utbult, KD, 2017, March 22)
The substance abuse policy…has seriously reinforced
stigmatisation and exclusion. It’s a lot about shame,
guilt, punishment, refusing clean syringes, refusing
care and treatment, deficient social care, homeless-
ness. (Post 31, Karin Rågsjö, V, 2016, June 16)
In the first quote, homelessness is presented as a result
of other individual problems, in the second as coexisting
or alternating with these problems and in the third as
caused by faulty drug policy, but they all underline the as-
sociation of homelessness with individual problems, es-
pecially substance abuse.
Although ‘homeless’ is often combined with drug
abuse, it is not connected to crime. On the contrary,
homelessness is sometimes clearly dissociated from
criminality. This is from a debate on punishment:
Almost all these criminals live on welfare today. None
of them is homeless or has to commit a crime to get an
income or their daily food. (Post 47, AdamMarttinen,
SD, 2016, December 7)
There are no homeless criminals today, but these
persons [the criminals] have, in most cases, an
apartment… (Post 49, Adam Marttinen, SD, 2016,
December 7)
Note the objective modality—this is presented as facts,
not as estimates or personal opinions. By presenting
homelessness and criminality as mutually exclusive con-
ditions, this speaker seems to argue that criminals de-
serve no compassion and, indirectly, that homeless peo-
ple do.
4.1.3. Homelessness as Signifying Government Failure
In Parliament, ‘our homeless’ may be used to underline a
national duty in contrast to other demands and commit-
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ments, as in the following post from a debate about the
fee to the EU:
The number of homeless people is increasing. Mental
health is declining among young women. Cancer pa-
tients die while waiting for surgery. We have blasts,
shootings, executions. Let us secure our own streets
before we build roads in other countries. Let’s warm
our homeless people before sending tax money to
the EU. Let’s give our elderly food before we fight in-
justices in Europe. Let’s first save Sweden, before we
save the world. (Post 26, Dennis Dioukarev, SD, 2019,
December 18)
While he places himself somewhat above the listeners,
like a preacher addressing his parish, this speaker rhetor-
ically lists social problems neglected by the Government
to the benefit of the EU and the rest of the world.
Our streets, our homeless, our elderly and Sweden are
all positioned as something we should care for in the
first hand.
The SD’s political goal is to stop refugee immigration,
which is seen as the cause of domestic homelessness.
In the following quote, the same speaker gives his point
through comparing the sheer numbers of homeless peo-
ple (whose difficulties are emphasised with concrete pic-
tures) to the number not of human migrants, but of ‘res-
idence permits’:
We talk about 107,000 residence permits—there are
30,000 homeless people in Sweden. They sleep on
park benches and stand in food queues. Where is the
justice in this? (Post 45, Dennis Dioukarev, SD, 2018,
December 12)
Homelessness is highlighted as a symptom of govern-
ment failure by other political parties with other agen-
das, too. The following excerpt is from a Liberal’s argu-
ment for deregulated rents and more owner-occupied
dwellings:
I can guarantee that people are not homeless in Oslo,
Copenhagen, Helsinki and Reykjavik….Go for study vis-
its in Oslo, Copenhagen and Helsinki and see for your-
self whether people are homeless there. They are
not….It is, in practice, ever so easy to get housing
in Oslo or Copenhagen. (Post 127, Robert Hanna, L,
2016, March 23)
Note the objective modality regarding the non-existence
of homelessness and easy access to housing in other
countries’ capitals (“people are not homeless,” “they are
not”), which is rather underlined by the subjective addi-
tions (“I can guarantee”; “see for yourself”).
In summary, ‘(our) homeless’ is generally used for
homeless Swedish residents who are mentioned with
a certain degree of compassion, sometimes reinforced
by combining and integrating the term with other in-
dividual problems, resulting in an image of miserable,
helpless, maybe old people, worthy of sympathy, pity
and help. This impression is further strengthened by
the fact that they, unlike other houseless groups, are
not associated to—and occasionally clearly dissociated
from—criminality. As homelessness is an indisputable
problem, the term is also used rhetorically to indicate
the Government’s failure to protect, care for and house
its citizens.
4.2. Other Countries’ Homeless
So where do the homeless belong, if they are not
ours? If ‘homeless’ only refers to the target groups of
the municipal social services, who is responsible for ac-
commodating other people with similar deficient hous-
ing situations?
In Parliament, as well as in many public declarations,
the responsibility for homeless people from other coun-
tries is often explicitly placed on the countries of origin,
like in the following statement by the organisation for
municipalities and regions, SALAR (2015, p. 2):
The individuals who beg in Sweden are a result of
the discrimination against Roma people in Romania
and Bulgaria. SALAR thinks that international coop-
eration must be reinforced in order to put pressure
on the concerned countries to take responsibility for
their citizens.
‘Vulnerable EU-citizens’ are repeatedly discussed in
Parliament, but not because of their homelessness.
Rather, they are positioned either as acting subjects (see
below) or as victims of their home country’s neglect.
Several of the EUmember countries do not do enough
to support their citizens. Instead, they continue to dis-
criminate against and force citizens—especially Roma
people—to lasting exclusion, where the only alterna-
tive becomes to go to countries where there is an op-
portunity to earn a little for themselves or for those
who remain at home. (Post 10, Ola Johansson, C, 2017,
May 17)
Note that homelessness is not mentioned in these
quotes, only citizenship, ethnicity, begging and discrim-
ination in the countries of origin. Even though beg-
gars from other EU-countries are indeed homeless when
in Sweden, and this situation is described, they are
rarely ascribed this attribute. The point made is that
Swedish authorities are not responsible for other coun-
tries’ citizens.
4.3. Nobody’s Homeless
This section is about two related phenomena: First, the
tendency to pass a given responsibility on to other ac-
tors or institutions and, secondly, the fact that problems
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caused by the market tend to be left without any po-
litical measure if these imply interventions in property
rights. In a neoliberal society, which supports free mar-
kets of labour, housing and capital and where the indi-
viduals’ free choice and responsibility for their situation
are underlined, no statutory body is accountable for mar-
ket failures.
4.3.1. The Dislocated Newly-Arrived
Although municipalities have the ultimate responsibility
to see to it that those people who stay within its bor-
ders do not suffer and are obliged to receive and ac-
commodate newly-arrived refugees who are assigned to
them by the Migration Agency, several municipalities try
to pass over these responsibilities to others. Many of
them require as a condition for accommodation that the
assigned refugees seek and accept housing of all kinds
throughout the country, and evict them after two years
if they fail. Even before two years have passed, some
place their assigned refugees in neighbouring municipal-
ities that are expected to provide accommodation and
support, if needed, when the state allowances end.
The news agency TT has reported that several newly-
arrived homeless people have been dislocated from
Stockholm to municipalities in the north of Sweden
(“Dumpad I Kramfors,” 2019). In January 2020, the chair
of the councils in 113 (of 290)municipalitiesmetwith the
Minister of Public Administration to complain about the
‘social dumping’ of unemployed refugees. This tendency
was previously highlighted in Parliament through a writ-
ten question on “Export of socially vulnerable people”:
Several homeless persons from the Stockholm area
claim that they have been forced by various social ser-
vice administrations to move and to sign leases in, for
instance, Hagfors [municipality] if they want contin-
ued support from the social services….The pattern is
that one moves from larger cities at the end of the
establishment period to smaller municipalities that
already have a tough situation regarding unemploy-
ment and integration. What measures do you intend
to take to overcome the problem of exporting socially
vulnerable people to smaller municipalities? (Written
question 2018/19:702 by Mikael Dahlqvist, S)
While the social services in Stockholm are positioned as
the acting perpetrator, and the minister is urged to act,
both the smallmunicipalities and the dislocated refugees
are positioned as victims of this city’s strategy. Note that
the speaker called the latter homeless, but the minister
(from the same party) to whom the question was ad-
dressed did not. She answered that although it is not
acceptable that municipalities pass on their responsibili-
ties to others or force people to move, “the Government
is prevented from having views on how a municipality
should act in an individual case or giving instructions on
how laws and other regulations should be interpreted”
(Lena Hallengren, S, 2019, June 12). The minister’s ac-
count was an excuse—she could not intervene—but at
the same time, a justification—these people were not
the Government’s responsibility.
So, although they have residence permits and are
assigned to and registered in a certain municipal-
ity, refugees risk deportation to other municipalities.
Sometimes neither the state nor any municipality is will-
ing to include them as ‘their homeless.’
4.3.2. ‘Structurally Homeless’
In the last decade ‘social homelessness’ has been sta-
tistically separated from ‘structural homelessness.’ The
causes of the latter are judged to be structural, i.e., short-
age of affordable housing, poverty and landlords’ re-
quirements. As mentioned above, social services tend to
reject the structurally homeless as not eligible for accom-
modation. In a Parliament debate on child poverty, this
problem was highlighted:
A problem is that the structural homelessness, which
is due only to the lack of housing and money, has in-
creased. Can the Government develop how you in-
tend to work with this? (Post 37, Rasmus Ling, MP,
2018, February 8)
The minister answered that “the municipal social ser-
vices are commissioned to prioritise families with mi-
nor children” but that she was “following this issue
closely, because it is extremely important that children
do not experience this” (Post 38, Åsa Regnér, S, 2018,
February 8). Again, the municipalities alone are responsi-
ble. ‘Homeless children’ is not a state issue.
However, the concerned cities’ social services, in
turn, claim that they are only accountable for the
‘socially homeless,’ often called ‘our target group.’
Hence, no statutory body at the local or central level
accepts responsibilities for this group—they are no-
body’s homeless.
5. If not Homeless—What?
As shown above, many houseless people are discursively
excluded from the ‘homeless’ category, even if their
housing situation and inability to improve it fits well
with theNBHWdefinition of homelessness. Paraphrasing
Simmel (1908/1965), the homeless are only those who
are entitled to support as homeless. But how are the
other categories named and characterised, and how are
they morally related to (our) homeless?
5.1. Rivals and Enemies of Our Homeless
Newly arrived migrants, asylum-seekers and EU-citizens
are not only excluded from the ‘homeless’ concept but
sometimes also positioned as antagonists to the “home-
less Swedes”—especially by the SD party:
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Young people…cannot leave their homes due to the
shortage of housing…students forced to stay in tents
all over the country. Swedish Television reported re-
cently that residents of a nursing home in Värmdö
[municipality] had to stay in containers….At the same
time, Sweden has in recent years received hundreds
of thousands of asylum-seekers, most of whom with-
out real refugee reasons, which is also the main ex-
planation of the current situation….We can see today
how municipalities give precedence in the housing
queues to so-called newly arrived, while other mu-
nicipalities choose to offer them single-family houses
and owner-occupied flats. In manymunicipalities, the
newly arrived are also offered expensive hotel rooms.
This occurs at the same time as the proportion of
homeless Swedes increases. The situation is deeply
unfair and discriminating….Minister Eriksson, what
measures are you prepared to take to improve the sit-
uation for the Swedes who are displaced in the hous-
ing market? (Written question 2016/17:730, Rickard
Jomshoff, SD, 2017, January 26)
In this post, the blame is primarily put on the municipal-
ities as agents that ‘choose to offer’ attractive housing
and ‘expensive hotel rooms’ to the newly arrived, but
also on the state for letting too many asylum-seekers
in. The repeated ‘at the same time’ underlines both the
asymmetry and the correlation between refugee recep-
tion and “homeless Swedes.” While the state and mu-
nicipalities are positioned as perpetrators, and asylum-
seekers and the newly arrived as privileged favourites,
“homeless Swedes,” young students and nursing home
residents are positioned as victims.
The image of old, frail people living in “containers”
and refugees (“without real refugee reasons”) in luxu-
rious housing makes up a ‘contrast structure’ (Smith,
1978), aiming at underlining the injustice to “homeless
Swedes.”
EU-citizens, too, have been positioned as favoured
competitors concerning shelter places in comparison to
(Swedish) homeless people, who are again positioned as
being discriminated against, as in the following letter to
the editor:
What about our homeless?
Why are Swedish rough-sleepers treated differently
than poor people from Romania/Bulgaria?
During the whole of the 2000s (15 years), it has been
reported that in Gävle [municipality], there is no room
for homeless people in the local shelters, there is no
accommodation. But now suddenly places have been
arranged for foreign EU-citizens who have travelled
here! Nowwewant to see that Swedish homeless also
get accommodation, immediately.
Justice for us Swedes! (“Våra hemlösa då?,” 2015)
The absence of responsible agents is striking—people
are “treated,” problems are “reported,” “there is no
accommodation”—but the words “now suddenly places
have been arranged” indicate that somebody is decid-
ing and acting after all, and implicitly, could have acted
before. “Swedish rough-sleepers,” “homeless people,”
“Swedish homeless” and “us Swedes” seem interchange-
able; all are positioned as disfavoured to the benefit of
“foreign EU-citizens,” the antagonists that do not belong,
but “travelled here.” Again, ‘homeless’ is only used for
Swedes, and ‘us Swedes’ at the end of the letter further
underlines the antagonism.
These EU-citizens are occasionally positioned as dan-
gerous enemies to Swedish homeless people, as in the
following post:
These beggars enter staircases, they beg, they pollute
in parks and woods…they attack and steal from our
homeless. And the Government just stands watching
all this. It’s shameful! (Post 45, Kent Ekeroth, SD, 2016,
February 4)
Here, the victim position of ‘our homeless’ reinforces the
beggars’ positions as villains and antagonism between
the two groups is established while the Government is
positioned as a passive bystander.
5.2. Illegal Squatters
Although the last quote is somewhat odd, the general im-
age of EU-citizens as a source of crime and disorder pre-
vails in Parliament. In 2015, the Government appointed a
national coordinator to propose measures for this group.
However, his final report had no suggestions on housing
or accommodation but was rather occupied with evic-
tion measures:
The message from the Swedish society should be
clear. EU-citizens are welcome here, at the same
time Swedish legislation shall be applied. It is pro-
hibited to reside in parks or other public places or
on private land. (National Coordinator for Vulnerable
EU-Citizens, 2016, p. 9)
In the Parliament debates, too, EU-citizens are primarily
characterised as intruders and a nuisance for the police
to act against:
Mr Speaker! Huts, tents and caravans—temporary set-
tlements on private land prevent the owner from us-
ing the land. Often the landowner has to clean, sani-
tise and restore the land afterwards. But whoever
settles on someone else’s land without permission is
guilty of a crime. (Post 1, Caroline Szyber, KD, 2017,
May 17)
These temporary settlements are not associated with
homelessness, butwith violation of ownership. Theword
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‘homeless’ is not found at all in the bill that suggests
facilitation of ‘removals’ of these settlements, and in
the 50-page-long Parliament Committee report (Sveriges
Riksdag, 2017) discussing the bill, ‘homeless’ occurs only
once–in a critical motion by the Left Party. Eventually,
the Parliament accepted new legislation that facilitated
eviction of houseless EU-citizens from private and pub-
lic land.
5.3. Criminal Outsiders
If criminals are sometimes compared to homeless peo-
ple as two mutually exclusive categories, vulnerable
EU-citizens are, on the contrary, often associated with
various crimes and illegalities. A Parliament debate on an
interpellation by a member of the Moderate Party pro-
vides an example:
The Swedish Prime Minister has said that begging in
Sweden shall and must cease….Despite this, the prob-
lem with crime coupled to the vagrant EU-migrants
continues. In the city and county of Stockholm, it has
gone so far that people who work in park cleaning
have to carry assault alarms with a direct connection
to SOS Alarm… (Interpellation 2016/17:571 by Jesper
Skalberg Karlsson, M)
No backing or reference is given to the association be-
tween begging and park cleaners’ assault alarms. In the
debate, more crime images were added:
I want to highlight the part of begging where criminal
actors control vulnerable people’s lives, expose them
to human trafficking and oppress them for their eco-
nomic gain….Men, often the head of the family, who
force wife and children to beg in Sweden….We must
recognise that many activities surrounding begging
and beggars are criminal and problematic. (Post 30,
Jesper Skalberg Karlsson, M, 2017, June 26)
The Minister of Home Affairs replied that “above all,
we shall sharpen the enforcement of the law” (Post 31,
Anders Ygeman, S, 2017, June 26), and the interpellant
added that it would not be sufficient to prohibit beg-
ging, since “most of the things these people are occu-
pied with are already illegal” (Post 32, Jesper Skalberg
Karlsson,M, 2017, June 26).While the beggingwomen in
his previous quote (Post 30, Jesper Skalberg Karlsson, M,
2017, June 26) are positioned as victims of men’s traffick-
ing and oppression, they are in Post 32 themselves posi-
tioned as criminal actors alongside their husbands. Thus,
the equivalence between begging and crime is gradu-
ally established.
Undocumented immigrants, too, recur in the
Parliament debate as an outsider group, associated with
crime. According to the quote below, they need to be
more strongly monitored and deported more efficiently
to avoid a “permanent shadow society”:
Sweden currently has no control over the number
of people staying illegally in the country….If this is
not stopped, it will lead to a permanent shadow so-
ciety that can be characterised by vulnerability, ex-
ploitation and crime….Many choose to lead a life be-
side the Swedish society. For them, income often
comes from illegal work and criminality….What does
the Government intend to do to see to it that more
of those who have been rejected, return instead of
staying illegally in Sweden? (Post 6, Christian Holm
Barenfeld, M, 2018, February 8)
Although the undocumented migrants are initially pre-
sented as victims of exploitation, just like the begging
women above, they are primarily positioned as criminal
actors themselves: They earn their living through “illegal
work and criminality,” remain “illegally” and “choose” a
life aside. In her answer, the Minister of Labour Market
and Establishment confirmed the seriousness and scope
of the problem, called it “unacceptable,” and declared
that “the Government is intensifying its work in terms
of resources for the police to enable them to execute
expulsions of people” (Post 7, Ylva Johansson, S, 2018,
February 8).
6. Conclusion
The official definition of homelessness in Sweden de-
parts from certain deficient housing situations, but in
actual counting, reporting and mapping of the home-
less population in Sweden, several groups are explic-
itly excluded in the survey instructions and/or implic-
itly excluded since they are not attended to by the so-
cial workers who report homeless people in the surveys.
Just like Simmel (1908/1965) wrote more than a century
ago about the poor, ‘the homeless’ are in practice de-
limited to those who get (or should get) assistance be-
cause of their housing situation. Asylum-seekers, undoc-
umented migrants, newly-arrived refugees and vulner-
able EU-citizens from abroad are not eligible for shel-
ter, either because they are targeted by other institu-
tions, such as the Migration Agency and the police, or
because they are defined as the responsibility of their
home countries—they are others’ homeless, not ‘ours.’
Just like in 19th century Sweden, the blame and obliga-
tions are placed on the jurisdiction in which the prob-
lem first emerged. The same kind of reasoning is often
applied to asylum-seekers and, outside the Parliament,
sometimes even to refugees who have been granted asy-
lum, who may be told to “go home.” Also, and despite
still being called homeless, manymigrant families are de-
fined out from the social services’ target groups as ‘struc-
turally homeless.’ As victims of poverty and a deficient
housing market, they are nobody’s responsibility.
This institutionally motivated and regulated exclu-
sion of houseless people in Sweden from the category
‘homeless’ is reflected and reinforced in the political
debate. Analyses of questions, replies and debates in
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the Parliament show that the term ‘our homeless’ of-
ten refers only to Swedish citizens, especially when they
are contrasted to migrants. Reflecting the tendency in
social services, ‘homeless’ is often associated with mis-
ery and problems like substance abuse and mental ill-
ness (althoughnotwithmorally condemnedqualities like
criminality and violence).
According to Simmel (1908/1965), ‘the poor’ are
both inside and outside the community, which is obliged
to assist them, but being outside is also a kind of mem-
bership in the group (cf. ‘our’ homeless). But—to para-
phrase him—if they are only homeless,where do they be-
long? Simmel concludes that they belong to the “largest
effective circle,” which “has no other outside it to which
to transfer an obligation” (p. 127). In his view, this was
the nation-state, but in our time it would rather be the
EU. However, this community does not provide housing
for its citizens.
While the ‘homeless’ are embracedwith certain com-
passion and empathy in the discourse, other terms like
EU-citizens, beggars, refugees, migrants, newly arrived
etc. do not seem to carry the same kind of protective
imperative. On the contrary, some of these categories
tend to be associated with trafficking, crime, disorder
and violation of property rights. When ‘(our) homeless’
are positioned as victims of these other groups’ crime,
or as put aside or discriminated against to their benefit,
the Government is urged to take side through exclusion-
ary measures, e.g., remove them from public and private
land, expel them from the country or stop them from en-
tering Sweden. In this respect, ‘our homeless’ is used as
a tool in xenophobic rhetoric.
From this limited, explorative study, it is clear that
a new political discourse on homelessness has emerged,
which ascribes more weight to ethnic belonging and na-
tional origin than to the actual housing situation and
needs. This discourse is in line with the different treat-
ment of groups with similar, deficient housing situations
in social services and national legislation. Both the insti-
tutional change and the new discourse reflect and might
reinforce nationalist and xenophobic sentiments. For so-
cial research into homelessness, it is an urgent task to
follow the development of this discourse in political as-
semblies at national as well as local levels.
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